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CASE NOTE
PENSION LAW-Garnishment-Pension Fund Benefits Gov-
erned By The Federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act Are Subject To Court-Ordered Alimony And Child Support
Payments. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592
F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
Plaintiffs, American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T)
and Chemical Bank, operate a pension benefit plan in which the
defendant, Addison D. Merry, participated.' In 1966 Ann R. Merry,
co-defendant in this action, obtained a judgment of divorce against
Mr. Merry in the Connecticut Superior Court.' The terms of the
decree required Mr. Merry to pay alimony and child support in an
amount equal to one-half his monthly pension benefit from the
AT&T plan.' When Mr. Merry defaulted in his payments, Mrs.
Merry obtained a judgment for arrearages from the court in the
amount of $22,422.34.1 She contended that she was entitled to re-
ceive her husband's pension benefits until the judgment was fully
satisfied.5 The Connecticut Superior Court agreed. The court issued
a garnishment order against the AT&T pension plan,' whereupon
the plaintiffs (AT&T and Chemical Bank) instituted an action in
the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut.7
Plaintiffs argued that the garnishment was ineffective because
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) 8
protects pension plans from such action. Specifically, they pointed
to section 206(d)(1) of the Act which states that pension fund bene-
1. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 4 Fain. L. Rep. 2831 (D. Conn. 1978)
(BNA). Co-plaintiff Chemical Bank administers the plan as trustee and custodian of the
pension fund. Ann R. Merry and Addison D. Merry are the co-defendants.
2. Id. at 2832.
3. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 1979).
4. Id. at 120.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. While the district court action was pending, Mrs. Merry obtained a supplemental
judgment from the Connecticut Superior Court for additional arrearages totaling $32,373.92.
She cross-claimed against her former husband for this amount in the district court but the
cross-claim was dismissed on the ground that a federal court could not interfere with the state
court authority in matters of domestic relations. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed on other grounds. Id. at 126.
8. 29 U.S.C. § 1001-81 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ERISA].
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fits may not be assigned or alienated.' They claimed further that the
state court was without authority over the controversy in this in-
stance since ERISA, a federal statute, pre-empts state laws affect-
ing employee pension benefit plans.'0
The district court did not agree with the plaintiffs' argument. It
ruled that ERISA did not prohibit the garnishment of pension plan
benefits to satisfy alimony and support payments nor did it displace
the state court's authority in this area by its pre-emption provi-
sions." Judge Newman found that enforcement of a state court gar-
nishment order is clearly to be preferred when the court must choose
between enforcing the rights of a former wife to overdue support
payments or the rights of a delinquent former husband."
Plaintiffs appealed from the district court decision in an effort to
clarify their rights and obligations as fiduciaries under ERISA. 13
They also sought to protect the pension plan from loss of its favora-
ble tax status" and from unanticipated increases in administration
costs which might result from the decision.' 5 The Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court decision.' " Judge
Werker, '7 writing for the court, indicated that a state court garnish-
ment order issued against a pension plan to satisfy support and
alimony payments was "impliedly excepted" from the provisions of
ERISA which prohibit assignment and alienation of pension funds
9. Id. § 1056(d)(1).
10. 4 Faro. L. Rep. at 2832.
11. Id. The court had trouble reaching this decision inasmuch as it found the statutory
language in ERISA unclear. There was no substantial evidence of a congressional intent to
prohibit the garnishment of pension funds to satisfy support obligations. The court elected
to interpret the statutb in accordance with the dictates of public policy rather than leave the
issue for eventual resolution by Congress. Id.
12. Id.
13. ERISA charges the fiduciary with meeting the standard of "care, skill, prudence and
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capac-
ity and familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character
and with like aims .. " ERISA § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1976).
14. "A trust shall not constitute a qualified trust under this section unless the plan of
which such trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned
or alienated." I.R.C. § 401(a) 13, 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(13) (1976).
15. For example, the clerical work involved in redirecting a portion of a garnished pension
benefit to comply with a court order of support would be one factor contributing to increased
costs.
16. 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
17. Honorable Henry F. Werker, United States District Judge for the Southern District
of New York, sat by designation in this case. Id.
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and which pre-empt state law. 8 When Congress created ERISA, he
continued, it did not intend to change traditional support obliga-
tions, but rather, to ensure that pension benefits are available upon
retirement. '"
Prior to the enactment of ERISA in 1974, there were many prob-
lems involving pension plans."0 These include inadequacies in cover-
age, loss of pension benefits due to plan terminations, misuse of
pension funds and lack of disclosure of pension operations.2' ERISA,
as originally introduced in the Congress in 1967, was intended to
assuage the public's fear of deficiencies in the pension fund system
which threatened the security of an adequate income upon retire-
ment.21 In order to accomplish this goal, Congress required the dis-
closure and reporting of pension plan operations to participants,
established standards of conduct, and defined the obligations of
fiduciaries under these plans.23 In addition to providing remedies
and sanctions, Congress removed the usual requirements of amount
in controversy and diversity of citizenship to allow aggrieved parties
ready access to the federal courts. All plans were required to have
insurance against termination so that accrued benefits would be
available to employees upon retirement. Through these measures
18. Id. at 121. Judge Werker was responding to the plaintiff's claim that ERISA pre-empts
all state law unless there is an express statutory exception. The judge dismissed such a literal
interpretation as unreasonable since it would have ERISA pre-empt virtually every state law
having a remote relation to pension plans. Such a limitation without exception would inter-
fere with the traditional predominance of state authority in the areas of domestic relations.
Id.
In response to the plaintiff's concern that compliance with the garnishment order would
breach a fiduciary duty, the court indicated that every fiduciary is subject to court guidance.
When the plaintiffs allow garnishment of plan benefits pursuant to a court order, they are
protected from liability for breach of their fiduciary duty. With regard to plaintiffs' fear of
loss of their plan's tax qualified status, the court indicated that the Internal Revenue Service
has recognized an implied exception for the enforcement of family support rights. While the
court recognized the possibility of increased administration costs to plaintiffs, it viewed these
costs as minimal in comparison to the overwhelming public benefit of its decision. Id. at 125.
19. Id. at 124.
20. H. R. REP. No. 93-807, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974) U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4670, 4677. [hereinafter cited as H. R. REP. No. 93-807]. For a history of
ERISA, see Note, At Variance with the Administrative Exemption Procedures of ERISA: A
Proposed Reform, 87 YALE L.J. 760, 761-65 (1978).
21. H. R. REP. No. 93-807, supra note 20, at 4678-81. See Note, Legal Problems of Private
Pension Plans, 70 HARV. L. REv. 490, 495 (1957).
22. S. REP. No. 93-127, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& An. NEws 4838.
23. 29 U.S'.C. § 1001(b) (1976).
24. Id. §§ 1001(b), 1132(f) (1976).
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-Congress hoped to increase the number of workers participating in
employer-financed plans.2
Despite careful drafting of the statute, however, there has been
much litigation on the issue of whether pension funds may be gar-
nished to satisfy support and alimony orders. In New York, the
courts have consistently permitted enforcement of support and ali-
mony orders against pension plans." For example, in Cogollos v.
Cogo11osl a divorced wife sought to enforce a court order of support
against her ex-husband's pension benefits.28 Attorneys for the pen-
sion plan argued that ERISA prevented the assignment and aliena-
tion of pension benefits but the supreme court allowed enforcement
of the outstanding support order.2 The court indicated that the New
York judiciary has in the past rejected the argument that ERISA
protects an employee spouse from his obligation to support his de-
pendents."0
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York came to the same conclusion in Cody v. Riecker.3 1 A trustee of
an employee pension benefit plan sued a state court judge, a city
sheriff and -others to enjoin a levy upon an employee's pension fund
benefits for the enforcement of the employee's obligation to support
his wife. 2 Plaintiff alleged violations of ERISA section 206(d)(1)
and article VI, section 10 of the employer's pension fund rules and
regulations which prohibit alienation of pension funds. 33 The court
rejected the claim that ERISA pre-empted all state laws. 4 It held
that the husband's obligation, which arose under the state law,
25. Id. § 1001(c) (1976).
26. See M.H. v. J.H., 93 Misc. 2d 1016, 403 N.Y.S.2d 411 (Fain. Ct. Queens County 1978)
(garnishment of pension funds for child support was not defeated by ERISA's ban on assign-
ment and alienation); see also Zwingman v. Zwingman, 150 A.D. 358, 134 N.Y.S. 1077 (2d
Dept. 1912); Monck v. Monck, 184 A.D. 656, 172 N.Y.S. 401 (1st Dep't 1918); Legler v.
Legler, 244 A.D. 55, 278 N.Y.S. 804 (4th Dep't 1935); Albert v. Albert, 199 N.Y.S.2d 766
(Sup. Ct. 1960); Wanamaker v. Wanamaker, 93 Misc. 2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Fain. Ct.
Rockland County 1978).
27. 93 Misc. 2d 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
28. Id. at 407, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 408, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 930.
31. 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
32. 454 F. Supp. at 22, 23.
33. Id. at 23.
34. Id. The court indicated that a husband's obligation to support his dependents does
not terminate upon retirement. Therefore, it reasoned pension funds should be made avail-
able for support purposes. Id.
(Vol. VII
CASE NOTE
could be enforced by executing upon the benefits of a pension plan
subject to ERISA.Y
Shortly after Cody, a similar action was brought in the Southern
District of New York to enjoin a family court from garnishing the
pension of a retiree to fulfill support obligations and make up arrear-
ages owed to his wife.36 The plaintiffs, members of the pension plan
committee, alleged that the order violated ERISA's prohibition
against assignment or alienation of pension benefits.37 The district
court held that while ERISA may protect benefits from attachment,
execution, or garnishment, it cannot prevent the enforcement of
validly executed court orders protecting alimony and support rights
of families. 8 Judge Weinfeld noted that the plaintiffs' contention
was premised upon a strict and literal interpretation of the language
of ERISA section 206(d)(1). 31 Such a literal interpretation, he con-
tinued, defeats the intention of Congress to preserve the "ancient
family law right of maintenance and support and the issuance of
process to enforce that right.''40
The preceding decisions are not the product of a rationale unique
to the New York courts. In Stone v. Stone" the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of California held that ERISA
did not pre-empt that state's community property laws.' 2 A depen-
dent spouse brought an action against her former husband for her
share of his pension benefits in accordance with the community
property laws of California. 3 Since an underlying purpose of ERISA
is to protect the families of employees participating in pension bene-
fit plans," the court indicated that ERISA is not in conflict with the
state law.45 It held that the non-employee spouse was entitled to half
the pension benefits owed to her former husband. 6
35. Id. at 24, 25.
36. Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
37. Id. at 1149.
38. Id. at 1156.
39. Id. at 1154. Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA states that "each pension plan shall provide
that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 U.S.C. §
1056(d)(1) (1976).
40. 457 F. Supp. at 1154.
41. 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D.Cal. 1978), appeal pending, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir.).
42. 450 F. Supp. at 932.
43. Id. at 919.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
45. 450 F. Supp.tat 931.
46. Id. at 926.
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• Several months later, however, the District Court for the North-
ern District of California took a much different position. In Francis
v. United Technologies Corp.'7 a non-employee spouse sought what
she considered to be her interest in her husband's retirement plan
under California's community property law." The court held that
ERISA pre-empted the state law which allowed a non-employee
spouse to have an interest in the pension plan of an employee
spouse." The court, referring specifically to its ruling in Stone,
stated that "[w]ith the exception of a participant's voluntary des-
ignation of a beneficiary (which designation has not been made)
ERISA prohibits any and all assignments or alienations of benefits.
No exception is made for the community property laws."50
In another California action," plaintiffs sued to avoid compliance
with a state law regulating the health care industry. 2 The District
Court for the Northern District of California ruled that ERISA pre-
empted state law by virtue of the specific language in section
514(a) .13 The court found that there could be no question of interpre-
tation here since the meaning of the statute was quite clear.54
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in American Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. v. Merry" did not find the reasoning in
Francis persuasive." Judge Werker stated that a decision involving
garnishment of pension fund benefits cannot rest solely on a literal
interpretation of sections 206(d)(1) and 514(a) of ERISA. The strong
47. 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 88.
50. Id. at 86. Under California community property law each spouse takes a one-half
property interest in all assets acquired during the marriage regardless of their needs. CAL.
CIVIL CODE § 5105 (West) (amended 1973).
51. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d
502 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 108 (1978).
52. 425 F. Supp. at 1295. The state law was the Knox-Keene Health Care Service Plan
Act of 1975 which duplicated many of the controls of ERISA in the areas of benefit plan
funding and disclosure among others. It was primarily involved in the health care industry
but also sought to regulate self-funded programs such as the one offered by plaintiffs. Id. at
1297.
53. Section 514(a) states that "this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar
as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(1976).
54. 425 F. Supp. at 1297. See also Ogle v. Heim, 69 Cal. 2d 7, 442 P.2d 659, 69 Cal. Rptr.
579 (1968) (California Supreme Court refused to enforce judgment for support payments
against retirement benefits protected by statute claiming it could not create an exception not
provided by the statute itself).
55. 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1979).
56. Id. at 123.
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public policy which required fulfillment of family support obliga-
tions must also be considered." The importance of this factor origi-
nates in the common law principle that a wage earning spouse has
a duty to support his dependents. 5
For example, in Schlaefer v. Schlaefer5 a spouse was confronted
with a state statute which exempted disability insurance from gar-
nishment, attachment and other legal process. 0 The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia stated that the claim of the spouse
was not a mere "debt" or "liability" as these words are usually
understood. Rather, a spouse's claim, arising out of the marital
relationship, created a higher obligation which was not within the
purview of the exemption statutes.6" Judge Rutledge stated: "Dis-
ability does not relieve him [the employee] of that obligation
though it may affect the extent to which he can perform it. The
obligation which he assumes upon marriage operates 'in sickness
and in health.' "162
ERISA recognizes this common law "right" to support when it
indicates that its purpose is to ensure the soundness of pension
plans for ". . . the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents .... ,,63 While it is true that sec-
tion 206(d)(1) prohibits voluntary and involuntary transfers of bene-
fits from the pension plan of an employee who has earned them,6"
the main purpose of the statute is to ensure that the employee's
accrued benefits are available upon retirement, impliedly for the
support of the employee's dependents as well as himself.5 Congress
cannot protect the security of pension payments once they are re-
ceived by the participant. Through section 206(d)(1) of ERISA,
however, it does protect those funds from the claims of creditors
prior to the time of payment.6 To interpret section 206(d)(1) as
57. ' Id. at 123, 124.
58. Schlaefer v. Schlaefer, 112 F.2d 177 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 186.
62. Id. at 185.
63. 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
64. A pensioner can, however, make a voluntary and revocable assignment of his pension
benefits up to ten percent. ERISA § 206(d)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1976).
65. H.R. REp. No. 93-807, supra note 19, at 4670, 4734.
66. See Michel v. Michel, 86 Misc. 2d 774, 776, 384 N.Y.S.2d 381, 382 (Faro. Ct. Rensse-
laer County 1976).
1979] 699
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barring garnishments for the benefit of a participant's dependents,
as well as for his creditors, would allow the employee spouse to
frustrate the essential purpose of ERISA by jeopardizing the well-
being of his dependents.
Moreover, it is clear that these two classes of claimants should be
treated differently. Unlike a general creditor, a non-employee
spouse is dependent on the pension benefits sought if he or she has
only one source of income-the employee spouse. 7 The non-
employee spouse also has no way to minimize losses once the sup-
port obligation is ignored," whereas a creditor can always use tax
write-offs or raise the selling price of its merchandise or services to
compensate for uncollectible debts.
A non-employee spouse does have the remedy of contempt when
an employee spouse ignores a court order of support."9 However,
should the delinquent spouse be arrested and incarcerated pursuant
to an order of contempt, the burden on society would only be in-
creased. In addition to supporting his dependents, the state could
now have to bear the expense of caring for the jailed spouse. 0 This
alternative to allowing garnishment of pension funds to fulfill obli-
gations is not at all attractive yet to do nothing would, as the New
York Supreme Court has said:
create a privileged sanctuary, behind which a delinquent husband or father
can thumb his nose at concededly valid and outstanding support orders. It
is inconceivable that Congress meant to authorize use of a pension fund as a
barrier behind which a husband could shed all his assets and income, live
on the pension arrangements, and leave his wife-or . infant children to
go begging for welfare."
Thus, support obligations do have a "special nature" which is based
upon strong public policy. It is this special nature which the courts
in Francis and similar decisions chose not to consider.
In Wanamaker v. Wanamaker," the Rockland County Family
Court held specifically that pension funds were meant for the use
of both husband and wife.73 A divorced husband tried to defend
67. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 927.
68. Id.
69. Ogle v. Heim, 69 Cal. 2d at 14, 442 P.2d at 663, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 583. See note 54 supra.
70. Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. at 1151.
71. Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d at 408, 492 N.Y.S. 2d at 93.
72. 93 Misc. 2d 784, 401 N.Y.S.2d 702 (Farn. Ct. Rockland County 1978).
73. The court found the real purpose of ERISA to be the provision of benefits for both
the pensioner and his dependents. Id. at 789, 401 N.Y.S. at 705, 706.
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against a support order by claiming that his former wife should be
considered a creditor and barred from this remedy by ERISA sec-
tion 206(d)(1). 7' The court made it clear that the wife was "not a
creditor within the exclusion provided for in the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974"'1 and allowed the support order
to stand despite the ERISA restrictions."
The argument has been made that "the non-financial contribu-
tions of the non-employee spouse are no less essential or valuable
to a marriage . . ." than the contributions of the employee spouse."
Under this view, the non-employee spouse is considered to have
"earned" his or her share of the pension benefits.78 The restrictions
of ERISA section 206(d)(1) are thus avoided since ownership rights
cannot be considered a garnishment, assignment or attachment of
property.7' With the growing appreciation for equality of men and
women, the common law duty to support one's dependents may
indeed give way to the view that marriage is "a joint enterprise and
shared undertaking, based on a division of labor, which should enti-
tle each spouse to a share of the family assets upon divorce. '"80
While the Second Circuit in Merry held that support obligations
were exempt from the prohibitions of section 206(d)(1) against
assignment and alienation and that these obligations were enforce-
able under state law, it acknowledged that section 514(a) of ERISA
pre-empts all state law." However, Judge Werker, in keeping with
prior decisions,"2 found that family support orders were "impliedly
excepted" from the pre-emption provision of ERISA because mar-
riage and divorce are areas of particular concern to the states.13
74. Id. at 784, 401 NY.S.2d at 702.
75. Id. at 789, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 706.
76. Id.
77. Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. at 927.
78. Id.
79. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 99 S. Ct. 802 (1979).
80. Inker, Walsh & Perocchi, Alimony and Assignment of Property: The New Statutory
Scheme in Massachusetts, 11 FAM. L.Q. 59, 61 n.8 (1977).
81. 592 F.2d at 120, 121.
82. See Cogollos v. Cogollos, 93 Misc. 2d. 406, 402 N.Y.S.2d 929 (Sup. Ct. 1978); Cody v.
Reicker, 454 F. Supp. 22 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), appeal pending, No. 78-7460 (2d. Cir.); Cartledge
v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919 (N.D. Cal.
1978), appeal pending, No. 78-2313 (9th Cir.).
83. 592 F.2d. at 121. See also Gersten v. Commissioner, 267 F.2d 195 (9th Cir. 1959); Lee
v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1201 (9th Cir. 1977); Commissioner v. Wilkerson, 44 T.C. 718
(1965), aff'd, 368 F.2d 552 (9th Cir. 1966).
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The United States Supreme Court has held that state laws are not
superseded by federal legislation unless there is a clear and manifest
intent of Congress. 4 No indication of an intent to interfere with
legitimate state concerns has been made by Congress or by the
Conference Committee Report on ERISA.8 1 In addition-the Supreme
Court has noted that the United States Constitution prohibits Con-
gress from infringing upon the power of each state "to make rules
to establish, protect and strengthen family life. .... 86 The tenth
amendment to the Constitution provides that states retain jurisdic-
tion over matters not clearly and specifically ruled upon by the
federal government. 7 Furthermore, it is evident from the disagree-
ment among the lower courts that no clear statement in the area of
support obligations has been made by Congress and that the states
therefore retain jurisdiction over such matters.
The argument is made, however, that ERISA explicitly pre-empts
any state law in the area of employee benefit plans.89 Section 514(c)
of the Act defines state law to include "all laws, decisions, rules,
regulations or other state action having the effect of law, of any
State." In Francis, the court held that this all-inclusive definition
was intended to pre-empt not only laws specifically directed to the
question of garnishment of pension plans but also those laws which
84. Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978). Further, it has been held
that only the clearest of congressional statements can be allowed to pre-empt policies of the
state. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973).
85. Pattiz, In a Divorce or Dissolution Who Gets the Pension Rights: Domestic Relations
Law and Retirement Plans, 5 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 191, 238 (1978).
86. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538 (1971). The Court held state law barring an
illegitimate child from sharing equally with legitimate children under an intestate distribu-
tion does not violate due process since the state has power to establish such rules for the
protection and strengthening of the family under the tenth amendment. Id. at 539, 540.
87. The tenth amendment states: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
88. Compare Francis v. United Technologies Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84 (N.D. Cal. 1978) with
Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). Despite the controversy, it would
appear that Congress has implied an exception in ERISA for support obligations since it has
already recognized similar exceptions in other statutes. Section 17(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy
Act, 11 U.S.C. § 35(a)(7) (1976), provides that a debtor will be released from all of his
provable debts upon a discharge in bankruptcy with the exception of his alimony and support
obligations. Likewise, section 456 of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 656 (1976), states
that where an individual is owed moneys from the United States, those funds are subject to
legal process to enforce legal obligations of child support and alimony payments.
89. 592 F.2d at 121.
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"affected" such plans.'" While the supremacy clause of the Consti-
tution supports.the pre-emption argument, since it provides that
any state law which conflicts with a federal law is invalid," the
Supreme Court has held that such a conflict can exist only when the
state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 2 The congres-
sional intent behind ERISA was, at least in part, to ensure support
for dependents of an employee spouse through the latter's pension
plan. 3 Thus, when a state court requires that such support be pro-
vided out of the employee spouse's pension benefits, it does not
"stand as an obstacle" to congressional goals and should, therefore,
be upheld.
The Supreme Court has warned that "injustice, oppression or an
absurd consequence may result from too limited a construction of
general terms in a statute."94 Courts faced with problems of statu-
tory construction must not only seek to avoid injustice but must
interpret the policies which the legislature sought to enforce.
The court of appeals in Merry has fulfilled this duty and in doing
so it has re-emphasized the intent of ERISA.
90. 458 F. Supp. 84, 8.
91. Article VI, cl. 2 of the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: "This
Constitution and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
• . .shall be the supreme Law of the Land."
92. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941). See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519,
526, 540-41 (1977); Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). See note 63 supra and accompanying text.
94. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 461 (1892). See Lau Ow Bew v.
United States, 144 U.S. 47, 59 (1892) ("Nothing is better settled than'that statutes should
receive a sensible construction, such as will effectuate the legislative intention, and, if possi-
ble, so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.")
95. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 392 (1970) ("It has always been
the duty of common-law court to perceive the impact of major legislative innovations and to
interweave the new legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law princi-
ples-many of them deriving from earlier legislative exertions.")
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